On factions
Today, I'm sharing an essay examining The Federalist No. 10 by James Madison.
The Federalist Papers were published in 1787-88 by Alexander Hamilton, James Madison, and John Jay to persuade New York voters to ratify the proposed U.S. Constitution. These essays explain and defend the Constitution's intended principles and structure. Federalist No. 10, written by Madison, addresses one of the key challenges facing the country at the time: how to prevent factions—groups acting against the public good—from undermining democratic government.
The nature of factions
In the Federalist No. 10, Madison presents the "propensity to [the] dangerous vice" of faction as one of the most pressing challenges to "popular government." He defines factions as groups of citizens "united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." His definition highlights two key elements: groups unified by shared passions or interests, and their inherent opposition to the common good. The danger stems not from mere disagreement—which Madison sees as natural and potentially beneficial—but from the tendency of factions to prioritize self-interest above the welfare of other groups and the community as a whole.
Factions pose an existential threat to popular government. Madison notes that the "instability, injustice, and confusion" they bring to public councils have acted as "the mortal diseases under which popular governments have everywhere perished." His medical metaphor reveals his view of faction as a pathology of democracy—one that has repeatedly proven fatal to governments throughout history.
Madison emphasizes that factions are not mere anomalies but emerge inevitably from human nature. "The latent causes of faction," he argues, "are thus sown in the nature of man." This inevitability arises from fundamental human traits: our fallible reasoning, self-love, and diverse faculties that lead to different opinions and interests. This recognition that factions are inherent to human nature forms the foundation for his examination of potential countermeasures.
Binary frameworks and their limits
Madison structures his analysis of faction through a series of binary choices. First, he asserts that we must find a cure for faction—reiterating his view of its inherent harm. Second, he presents two potential remedies: "There are two methods of curing the mischiefs of faction: the one, by removing its causes; the other, by controlling its effects." This framework implies a direct cause-and-effect relationship.
Finally, Madison explores what removing the causes of faction would entail, leading to these stark choices:
There are again two methods of removing the causes of faction: the one, by destroying the liberty which is essential to its existence; the other, by giving to every citizen the same opinions, the same passions, and the same interests.
This raises our central question: How does Madison deal with the questions of liberty and uniformity of opinion, and what alternative approaches to addressing the causes of faction might he have overlooked?
The liberty-uniformity dilemma
The first option—destroying liberty—is dismissed as "worse than the disease." Madison writes: "Liberty is to faction what air is to fire, an aliment without which it instantly expires." This comparison reveals more than the destructive potential of faction, pointing to its intimate connection to the very conditions that make political life possible. We cannot eliminate the causes of faction without also destroying an essential element of popular governance: liberty.
The second option—imposing uniformity of opinion and interest—Madison deems "impracticable." This impossibility is rooted in his understanding of human nature:
As long as the reason of man continues fallible, and he is at liberty to exercise it, different opinions will be formed. As long as the connection subsists between his reason and his self-love, his opinions and his passions will have a reciprocal influence on each other.
These differences are not merely incidental but fundamental to human society, "from which the rights of property originate." Madison also argues that protecting these different faculties is "the first object of government," making the enforcement of uniformity a direct confrontation with the very purpose of good governance.
These options (and the problems within them) reveal Madison's extreme position. He seeks nothing less than the complete elimination of the causes of faction, which he claims would demand either the total abolition of liberty or perfect uniformity in opinion and interest. The limitations of Madison's approach invite us to consider more nuanced possibilities to addressing the causes of faction. Rather than seeking total elimination, we might consider methods that moderate the intensity of faction while preserving both liberty and diversity of opinion.
Beyond binary solutions
Periodic economic reform presents one possibility. Madison identifies “the various and unequal distribution of property” as “the most common and durable source of factions.” Yet his binary framework leads us to see only two options: accept these disparities as inevitable or eliminate property differences entirely. A more nuanced approach might ask how economic structures could moderate extreme disparities while preserving the diversity of interests that Madison sees as essential. This could include mechanisms like social safety nets and progressive taxation—measures that acknowledge economic differences while preventing them from becoming so extreme as to threaten stability.
Shared education for all citizens presents another approach. While Madison acknowledges that "enlightened statesmen will not always be at the helm," he doesn't consider how we might cultivate a more enlightened and informed citizenry broadly. Universal civic education could foster the capacity for reasoned disagreement and help citizens recognize the common good amid diverse interests. For children, the concept of liberty already includes educational requirements, and for adults, civic education would constitute a modest limitation of freedom in service of a greater need. This approach acknowledges the fallibility of human reason while working to expand rather than constrain it—creating conditions where faction might naturally moderate without sacrificing the diversity Madison values.
These alternatives suggest that Madison's binary framing artificially limits our thinking about faction. While neither of these alternatives can promise to fully eliminate the causes of faction, they offer ways to moderate factional tendencies while maintaining liberty and diversity.
Rethinking cause and effect
Madison’s cause-and-effect model, though clear in its analysis of faction, oversimplifies the issue. The line between addressing causes and controlling effects often blurs. Civic education, for example, could both reduce factional tendencies and help citizens better manage the effects of existing faction. This points to a more dynamic relationship between causes and effects than Madison's binary framework allows for.
Furthermore, the metaphor of "curing" faction implies eliminating a disease, but faction might better be understood as an inherent feature of popular government—one requiring ongoing management rather than elimination. By focusing solely on faction's negative impacts and seeking its complete removal, Madison backs himself into extreme solutions that he must then reject as either "worse than the disease" or "impracticable."
These considerations raise deeper questions: Can a linear cause-and-effect model truly capture the complex nature of faction? Could certain types of faction actually serve as political safeguards, helping prevent the tyranny Madison seeks to avoid? Such questions reveal that the problem of faction presents not just a political challenge, but a philosophical conundrum about how the reality of human nature intersects with the aspirations of popular government.