On happiness and ways of life
This week, I'm sharing an essay on Book X of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, which examines human happiness (or more accurately flourishing) and how to achieve it.
Aristotle begins the Nicomachean Ethics by tackling a fundamental question: What is the "highest good" for human beings? His answer, happiness, is not a simple state of pleasure but a complex ideal of human flourishing. In Book I, Aristotle presents three ways of life: the pleasurable, the political (or moral), and the contemplative—each purporting to lead to happiness. He swiftly dismisses the life of pleasure as fit only for "fatted cattle" (1095b20), setting the stage for an exploration of the moral and contemplative lives and their relationship to true happiness.
Aristotle's argument reaches its climax in Book X. On one hand, he posits that "what is appropriate by nature to each being is best and most pleasant for each, and so, for a human being, this is the life in accord with the intellect, if that most of all is a human being" (1178a6-8). This assertion elevates the contemplative life as primary. On the other hand, he recognizes that "the virtues of the compound are of a human sort, so that the life and the happiness that are in accord with these are human as well" (1178a21-22). Here, Aristotle acknowledges the significance of moral virtues and practical judgment.
This juxtaposition reveals a tension at the core of Aristotle's ethics, leading us to a central question that will guide our inquiry:
How might we reconcile the conflict between the supremacy of the contemplative life and the necessity of the moral life, and what are the implications of this reconciliation for our understanding of happiness?
This essay will examine Aristotle's elevation of contemplation, his consideration of moral virtues and practical necessities, and the complexities his view presents in understanding the essence of human happiness and flourishing.
The contemplative life
Aristotle opens his exploration of contemplation by revisiting his definition of happiness as activity aligned with virtue. He asserts that complete happiness must therefore be "the being-at-work of [the best] part in accord with its own proper virtue" (1177a16-17). This "best part," Aristotle argues, is the intellect. He characterizes the intellect as possessing a "conception about things that are beautiful and divine" (1177a15) and being concerned with unchanging truths—"the most powerful of the things that can be known" (1177a22).
Contemplation, as the proper activity of the intellect, leads to complete happiness in Aristotle's view. He presents several arguments to support this claim. Firstly, contemplation is the most continuous of human activities—"we are more able to contemplate continuously than to act in any way whatever" (1177a24-25). Secondly, it is the most self-sufficient, requiring little by way of external goods and circumstances compared to moral actions (1177a27-b1). Thirdly, contemplation is loved for its own sake, having "no end beyond itself" (1177b21).
Aristotle further elevates contemplation by comparing it to divine activity. He contends that the gods, being supremely happy, must engage in contemplation rather than moral actions, which would be beneath them (1178b8-18). Thus, by engaging in contemplation, humans partake in an activity normally reserved for the gods, attaining the highest possible happiness.
The moral life
Despite his exaltation of contemplation, Aristotle acknowledges the significance of moral virtues and practical necessities. He recognizes that humans, as composite beings of body and soul, cannot escape their practical needs and social nature: "But insofar as he is a human being and lives in company with a number of people, he chooses to do the things that have to do with virtue" (1178b6-8).
Aristotle admits that moral virtues, such as courage, temperance, and justice, are essential for navigating “human concerns” (1178a14) and living well in society. He also underscores the role of practical judgment in guiding moral action. Practical judgment and moral virtue are inextricably linked: "the sources of practical judgment are dependent upon virtues of character, while the right thing belonging to virtues of character is dependent upon practical judgment" (1178a17-19).
This emphasis on moral virtues and practical judgment, while essential to human life, appears to conflict with the supremacy of contemplation that Aristotle has established. To reconcile this contradiction, Aristotle proposes a hierarchy of happiness. He maintains that contemplation leads to complete happiness, asserting that "the happiness that belongs to the intellect is separate [from that belonging to the compound being]" (1178a23). However, he also acknowledges a secondary form of happiness achievable through moral action: "The life in accord with the rest of virtue is happy in a secondary way, since the activities that result from it are human ones" (1178a9-10).
The tension
This hierarchical approach allows Aristotle to uphold the supremacy of contemplation while acknowledging the practical necessities of human life. However, it raises important questions about how contemplation and moral action might be balanced and integrated, and whether there can be such a thing as an excess of contemplation.
While Aristotle applies the concept of the mean to moral virtues, with virtue being the mean between excess and deficiency, he doesn't consider whether there could be too much contemplation. Could an overemphasis on contemplation lead to the neglect of necessary moral and social responsibilities?
Practical judgment could be seen as a potential bridge for this challenge. Unlike wisdom, with which contemplation is aligned, practical judgment engages with moral actions and the particularities of human life. However, its relationship to contemplation is ambiguous. Does practical judgment merely create conditions conducive to contemplation, or can it guide when and how to engage in contemplation, just as it guides moral action? Aristotle doesn't seem to explicitly address this question, leaving room for interpretation.
The tension between contemplation and moral action also reflects a deeper question about human happiness. Does our highest good lie in transcending our human nature through contemplation akin to the gods, or in fully embracing our human nature through the pursuit of moral action?
Compound happiness
While Aristotle's hierarchical view places contemplation at the pinnacle, capable of complete happiness on its own, we might argue that it lacks a fundamental human element—just as a purely moral life is seen as lacking something greater. Instead, we might propose a synthesis between these approaches that more fully integrates both the contemplative and moral aspects of human life: compound happiness. The concept of compound happiness acknowledges the special status of contemplation while embracing the distinctly human character of moral action. It places the happiness of the whole person, the compound being, above that of the intellect alone.
Compound happiness would involve a dynamic interplay between contemplation and moral action, recognizing that both are essential to human happiness. Rather than viewing contemplation as disconnected from moral virtue, this approach sees moral action and practical judgment as intrinsically valuable components of a well-lived life despite their need for greater “external props” (1178a25).
This synthesis aligns with Aristotle's recognition of humans as compound beings. It proposes that true happiness might be found not in transcending our human nature through pure contemplation, but in fully realizing our complex nature through a balance of contemplative and practical, moral activities. We might view this approach to happiness as a mean between two extremes: pure contemplation detached from human affairs on one end, and a life solely devoted to practical matters without reflection on the other.
While this approach extends beyond Aristotle's explicit arguments, it draws on elements present in his work and offers a potential resolution to the tensions we've explored. Aristotle may have hinted at this synthesis when he described the wise person who not only loves and honors the intellect but also acts "rightfully and beautifully" (1179a28-30).
However, the compound happiness approach is not without its challenges. Unlike Aristotle's clear hierarchy with its divine justification, compound happiness lacks a transcendent explanation for why a balance between the contemplative and moral life constitutes the highest good. Instead, it asks us to find meaning and fulfillment within the intricacies of human existence—one that includes divine-like activities but is not solely defined by them.